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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QVJARTERLY
ficiary and the exact result intended has been obtained, courts have
annulled contracts arising from such wrongful pressure, irre-
spective of the good faith of the beneficiary.'
In the present case, where the duress was directed toward an
end entirely distinct from the procurement of the release, doubt-
less the result was affected by the peculiar state of facts presented
and by their repellent background. As indicated by the holding,
one placed in a position knowingly to take advantage of a situation
produced by the unconscionable conduct of another proceeds at his
own risk in dealing with the victim. As a matter of fact, any indi-
cation of overreaching on the part of the beneficiary seems to be
treated as economic compulsion - as a veritable financial upper-
hand closed upon one rendered vulnerable thereto by the ante-
cedent duress imposed by a third party.
As an incident to the chief problem of the present chse, our
court, first reaffirming the proposition that fraud may be pleaded
by way of replication for setting aside a release,' holds that
a fortiori duress may be so pleaded.
W. E. N.
INSURANCE - INCONTESTABILITY CLAUSE - EXCEPTIONS AS TO
DOUBLE INDEmNITY AN DISABILITY BENEFITS. - More than two
years after issuance of a policy P insurance company sues to
rescind, on the ground of fraudulent misrepresentation in the ap-
plication, the provisions for disability benefits and double indem-
nity. D relies on a clause in the policy, which provides that "This
Policy shall be incontestable after two years fr6m its date of issue
except for non-payment of premium and except as to provisions
and conditions relating to Disability and Double Indemnity Bene-
fits." Held, that such incontestability clause does not preclude
215 Ky. 119, 284 S. W. 431 (1926); Payson B. & L. Soc. v. Taylor, 87 Utah
302, 48 P. (2d) 894 (1935).
9 Rodes v. Griffith, Rodes & Co., 102 W. Va. 79, 135 S. E. 244 (1926) ; Lip-
man, Wolfe & Co. v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 258 Fed. 544 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929);
Talley v. Robinson, 63 Va. 314 (1872), by dicta that-accomplishment of
intended purpose is sine qua non to relief for duress by third party.
The best justification for granting relief against the beneficiary for
duress practiced by a third party duressor, the duressor gaining no apparent
advantage from the dealings, seems to be the fact that both the innocent
parties are put in statuo quo. See Pound, Interests of Personality (1915) 28
HARV. L. REv. 343. Where the duressor has absconded with a part of the
benefits, a different problem arises, as it is impossible to put both innocent
parties in statuo quo.
10 Workman v. Continental Casualty Co., 115 W. Va. 255, 175 S. E. 63 (1934):
Norvell v. anawha & M. Ry., 67 W. Va. 467, 68 S. E. 288, 29 A. L. R. (N. s.)
325 (1910).
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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
suit by the insurer more than two years after issuance of the policy
to cancel disability and double indemnity provisions for fraud in
procurement of the policy. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bonasso.1
The particular clause involved in this case is of recent origin
and its effect has not previously been adjudicated in West Virginia.
In deciding this case, however, the court had two lines of authority
to consider.
One line of authority, which is represented by Ness v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co.,2 holds that the incontestability clause applies to the
double indemnity and disability benefit features,' basing this opin-
ion on the fact that there is ambiguity in such a clause and there-
fore it should be construed most strongly against the insurer and in
favor of the insured.4 The insertion of such a clause, which limits
defenses available to the insurer, is not a benevolent act of the in-
surer, but is an inducement to the prospective buyer; consequently
he should be favored in its construction.5 Another argument is
that the insurer in making out the policy could clearly state that
the disability and double indemnity features of the policy could be
contested at any time for fraud in the procurement.0
The other line of authority, which is headed by Equitable Life
Assurance Society v. Deem,7 holds that the incontestability clause
applies only to the life insurance feature. The reason given is that
the language cf the exception is clear and unambiguous and there-
fore it is not necessary to construe it in favor of the insured and
against the insurer.8
12 S. E. (2d) 260 (W. Va. 1939).
2 70 F. (2d) 59 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934).
3 Ness v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 70 F. (2d) 59 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934) ; Mutual
Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Markowitz, 78 F. (2d) 396 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935); Now
York Life Ins. Co. v. Yerys, 80 F. (2d) 264 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935); Horwitz "€.
New York Life Ins. Co., 80 F. (2d) 295 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935); Note (1935)
94 A. L. B. 1133.
4 Stroehmann v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 300 U. S. 435, 57 S. Ct. 607,
81 L. Ed. 732 (1936).
5 The incontestability clause is a selling point, because after the period
elapses, it protects insured's dependents against a contest for fraud claimed
after his death, in which if alive he would be principal witness. It also pro-
tects him after disability has weakened his memory and resistance rnd
destroyed his power to earn expenses of litigation. New York Life Ins. Co. V.
Kaufman, 78 F. (2d) 398, 402 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935).
'6 Horwitz v. New York Life Ins. Co., 80 F. (2d) 295 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935).
791 F. (2d) 569 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937).
8 Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Deem, 91 F. (2d) 569 (C, C. A. 4th, 1937);
Greber v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 43 Ariz. 1, 28 P. (2d) 817 (1934); Now
York Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 5 F. Supp. 316 (App. D. C. 1933); Pyramid Life
Ins. Co. v. Selkirk, 80 F. (2d) 533 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936); Note (1935) 94 A.
L. R. 1133.
2
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The West Virginia court in following this second line of
authority purports to distinguish the Ness case on the basis of a
slight difference in the wording of the incontestability clause."
At the same time, however, it recognizes that there are cases in-
volving an incontestability clause identical with the one in the
principal case which nevertheless adopt the view of the Ness case.
This tends to show that the court in fact rejected the Ness case, and
would probably reach the same result regardless of the wording of
the clause.
J. L. G., Jr.
WILLS - CONSTRUCTION - AyTm-AcQuiRED PROPERTY. - In
executing his will, the testator devised to his second wife and his
children by her, "all of my real estate, consisting of three certain
tracts or parcels of land situated in Walton District .... contain-
ing in all about 109 acres." Before his death he acquired two addi-
tional tracts in the same Walton district, comprising about 102
acres. The children of his first marriage, to whom he bequeathed
one dollar each, claimed that he died intestate as to the two tracts
he acquired after executing his will. Held, one judge dissenting,
that after-acquired property does not pass under a specific devise
when the description is not sufficiently broad to include the prop-
erty. Jarvis v. Jarvis.1
A West Virginia statute provides: "A will shall be construed,
with reference to the estate comprised in it, to speak and take
effect as if it had been executed immediately before the death of
the testator, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will."'
The court envisioned the testator as looking over the will at the time
of his death and finding that the "three certain tracts .... of land
containing . . . . 109 acres" could not mean five certain tracts
aggregating 211 acres. The majority opinion relied upon McComb
v. McCombY where the testator devised to his sons "all my real
o "Incontestability.-Except for non-payment of premiums and except for
the restrictions and provisions applying to the Double Indemnity and Dis-
ability Benefits as provided in Sections 1 and 3 respectively, this Policy shall
be incontestable after one year from its date of issue . . .I Ness v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 70 F. (2d) 59 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934). The important words of the
incontestability clause in the principal case are, ". ... except as to provisions
and conditions relating to Disability and Double Indemnity Benefits."
1 3 S. E. (2d) 619 (W. Va. 1939). The clause relating to the one dollar
bequest does not appear in the court's opinion, but is taken from the record
of the circuit court.
2W. VA. REv. CODE (Michie, 1937) e. 41, art. 3, § 1.
2 200 S. E. 49 (W. Va. 1939).
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